I. A DEFINING CHALLENGE
The independence of the judiciary is an enduring and defining objective of the legal profession. We lawyers, of all citizens, have the greatest stake in shielding judges from intimidation or reward. And that task of protecting judicial independence stands today at the very top of the agenda of the American legal profession. 1 The integrity of law and legal institutions requires more than just the protection of judges. It is equally dependent on the willingness and ability of judges to maintain virtuous disinterest in their work. 2 Some might explain their occasional failings as manifestations of the original sin inherited from Adam;' whatever their source, the proclivities of judges to indulge or celebrate themselves are perpetual temptations and judicial self-restraint is a perpetual challenge. As Cardozo explained: 'The great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men do not turn aside in their course and pass the judges by." ' A primary and indispensable constraint on those who judge is the moral constraint imposed by the professional community to which they belong. The primary function of transparency in proceedings at trials and arguments, and of published decisions and opinions explicating judges' rulings, is to manifest their disinterest not only to the parties whose contentions they judge, but also to their lawyers, who share responsibility for imposing moral judgment on the professionalism of judges. 5 of their decisions." The more we confer such political power on our judges, the more important it is that there be a system of disinterested accountability to correct their nonpolitical misdeeds and maintain their awareness of their own mortal limitations. Such a system or process is first a reminder to the profession of its responsibility for addressing judicial sins, and then a reassurance to the public that even Justices are accountable to law. The reform proposed below will not alone reverse the trend of mistrust of the federal judiciary that presently alarms many citizen-lawyers, but it would help.
A. The Founding Vision
The moral challenge of judicial independence is not new. It may help the reader to consider its presence in the early days of the Republic. The distance in time may help to maintain our own disinterest in assessing alternatives.
The American War for Independence was, the reader knows, initiated and led by a Continental Congress comprised in large part by lawyers presenting themselves as citizens practicing selfless civic virtue, that is, as advocates for the long-term interest of those they purported to serve.' 2 Heartened by their shared sense of high purpose and professional commitment, Thomas Paine optimistically proclaimed their achievement: "LAW IS KING." 13 Paine's revolutionary vision was that legal texts could and would express the intent of those governed so that disinterested judges could rule in the name of the governed as well as in the name of law, and thus would gain the acceptance and support of those whom they judged. 14 The Declaration of Independence protested, among other grievances, 11. We apologize for directing our attention here solely to federal courts, which generally receive so much more academic attention than do the state courts that decide many, many more cases. Our excuse for this misdirection is that it enables us to address a wider audience, but one less likely to be usefully influenced by academic utterances. See Robert S. Thompson 
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the failure of the king to provide the colonials with an independent judiciary whom they could trust to respect their legal rights. 5 The Founders implicitly promised to correct this failing. But what is it that federal judges and Justices should be "independent" of, other than a malevolent king? The Founders' answer to that question was never clearly stated, and their obscure text and its intent remain contested issues in contemporary discourse.
Some of the Founders fully understood that the judicial independence on which the rule of law depends is derived from the moral courage and professional self-discipline of judges. Only those qualities enable them to discount not only their own interests but those of their friends and political allies. George Wythe, the first American law professor, l " for instance, provided a premier example of the virtuous judge who could command respect on the regal scale that Paine had anticipated. 7 Classically minded Virginians compared Wythe to Aristides, "the Just."' 8 It was said of him, and apparently never questioned, that "[a] dirty coin [never] reached the bottom of [George] Wythe's pocket."' 9 Perhaps best remembered as the law teacher to Thomas Jefferson, John Marshall, and Henry Clay, Wythe concluded his career as the Chancellor of Virginia. 2 " Acting in that capacity, he was among the first judges ever to invalidate legislation as inconsistent with the higher law expressed in Virginia's Constitution. 2 
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[Vol. 50:1105 PROVIDING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR JUSTICES alone, knowing that the law he invalidated had favored the interests of his friends and political allies in the revolutionary movement and benefited some of those despised English against whom the Revolution had been waged.
Colonial judges were perceived to be intimidated by the royal government, 2 2 and the revolutionary lawyers had sensed their lack of judicial independence. They often had in mind the celebrated Edward Coke, 2 " who had been dismissed by King James I for his stated disregard of royal preferences in the decision of cases brought before the king's courts. 24 The Glorious Revolution of 1688 had brought King William and Queen Mary to the throne as monarchs who agreed to disown the executive power over the judiciary exercised by King James. 2 5 The Act of Settlement of 1701, agreed to by the monarchy, declared that their judges would serve for the period of their "good behavior" and be removable only by address of Parliament. 2 "
The Founders were also familiar with the experience of Francis Bacon. His term as Chancellor of England came to an early end in 1621 when he confessed to committees of Parliament and the House of Lords that he had received financial assistance from claimants whose claims he had upheld. 2 7 They accepted the familiar wisdom that power corrupts and knew that corruption takes diverse forms. 2 " But without pausing during a time of war to study the issues pre- The term "good behavior" had been in common usage in England at the time of the Act of Settlement, 3 2 but Article III of the Constitution, unlike the Act of Settlement, provides for impeachment in lieu of parliamentary address as the action to be taken by the legislature to remove a judge. 3 3 Address may reasonably be taken to impose less disapproval and humiliation on the addressee than does the term "impeachment." 34 But Article III does not specify the standards of "good behavior" that would immunize a judge from impeachment and removal from office or distinguish the standard for removal by impeachment from the standard for removal by address.
Only in Article II does the Constitution specify "high crimes and misdemeanors" as the standard to be applied in a proceeding to impeach and remove an officer of the executive branch. 35 A question never definitively resolved is whether the Article II standard applies to the impeachment of an Article III judge, or, if so, what might constitute a misdemeanor for the purpose of removing one who holds office for the duration of his or her "good behavior." Some federal judges speak of themselves as serving lifetime appointments; others more modestly say that they serve only as long as they are well-behaved.
There are clear differences between a judge and an executive officer that might seem to call for a difference in the standard to be applied by Congress when it considers its responsibility for removing an officer of an "equal branch" of the same government. Officers of the executive branch governed by Article II are subject to a measure of accountability to the electorate and to the President, whereas Article III judges are not. An ill-behaved President will meet his or her doom on election day, whereas an ill-behaved federal judge will not. That is one reason that officers of the executive branch were not expected to maintain the disinterest required of the judge. Executive officers must be expected in the performance of at least some of their duties to respond to diverse influences that are certain to taint the purity of their motives in performing public service. For these sound reasons, the Founders probably intended to hold judges to a higher measure of accountability than Congress for official behavior that is "not good" even if it is not a "high crime or misdemeanor." Article III of the Constitution does not speak explicitly to the possibility of age or term limits imposed by law. It is widely assumed that such limits are not within the power of Congress. 3 6 We have elsewhere contended otherwise. 37 But merely assuring judges the 'life tenure" of royalty, if the Constitution did so, hardly assured their fidelity to law anymore than it assured the king's fidelity to law. The fidelity of judges to law requires strong self-restraint. That morality can dissolve if it is not reinforced by a moral climate maintained by the profession of which they are a part. And judges who lack "life tenure" can be expected to practice courageous fidelity to law in order to maintain the respect of the citizen-lawyers with whom they work and of the public they serve.
Thomas Cooley was a notable example of a judge greatly respected for his integrity. He won the respect of the profession and the public soon after he was elected in 1865 as the first Republican justice of the Supreme Court of Michigan. 3 
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offices they thought they had won. 39 The case presented the question whether Michigan's constitutional provision limiting the right to vote to state residents invalidated the legislative enactment that enabled Union soldiers on duty in the South to vote by mail. 4°R egretfully, he explained that departing from the plain meaning of the words of the state constitution would loosen "the anchor of our safety.' In deciding the case on the basis of a close formal reading of a preexisting text, Cooley's decision won the admiration of citizens of diverse politics as a signal of their court's integrity.
But, alas, who can say for sure that Justice Cooley was not selfserving? Perhaps he sacrificed the jobs of his friends in order to win an accolade for himself. Would it have been a misreading of the statute to treat a soldier on temporary military duty in the South as still a "resident" of Michigan? Given our inevitable human failings, no judge, whether elected or appointed for life, can be expected to achieve perfection in suppressing all their impulses to behavior that is not "good." Law, at least in the United States, is no science. Citizen-lawyers therefore have a duty not only to reward with reverent respect those judges who, like Wythe and Cooley, overcome their self-serving and power-wielding instincts; they must also tolerate a reasonable measure of human failing by those appointed to practice the art of conforming their decisions to the expectations of their profession.
Still, power does corrupt. At some point on the variable scale of temptation, a judge's professional self-discipline fades. The Founders' vision imposes on Congress a duty to join in stripping judicial power from those who have succumbed to temptation or who are unable to perform their job. 4 " As Lord Coke himself asserted, when it is clear that judges are not performing their offices or are using them for their own purposes, it is time that they be replaced. And it is inevitably a task for the citizen-lawyer and the legal profession not only to support and defend judges whose conduct in office is within the limits of normal and expected human failings, but also to share responsibility when the time has come to punish or remove one who openly abuses or neglects the office. Moreover, one may reasonably infer from Article III that Congress has a constitutional duty to legislate reasonable standards of judicial conduct. 4 5 Alas, self-interest infects the decisions of groups as well as individuals. Professions, like college fraternities or sororities, alumni groups, labor unions, or trade associations, are given to group advancement even if it is sometimes at the expense of the larger ideals of the American dream, such as the general public interest. To avoid betrayal of larger public interests, citizen lawyers and federal judges 46 need a healthy skepticism that cautions against the advancement of the legal profession at the expense of the public it is licensed to serve. The requisite sense of professional responsibility for the exercise of moral judgment on judicial conduct has sometimes been lacking even among the leadership of the profession. 47 
The Federalists' "Ark of Safety"
Members of the founding generation soon encountered the difficulties of judging the judges they had appointed for the period of their "good behavior." Notwithstanding the composition of the Continental Congress and the Constitutional Convention, there was in the late eighteenth century, a shortage of Americans who were "learned in the law." Many colonials trained in law had been loyalists and had fled to Canada or abroad early in the Revolution. 4 them as an American aristocracy of sorts, 49 their profession was not at all times highly regarded by other citizens.
Notwithstanding disclaimers in the Federalist Papers that the courts were the 'least dangerous" branch of the new government, 5 0 it was soon widely recognized by others that American courts and the legal profession were, in the founding scheme, political institutions that were not concerned solely with the correct enforcement of preexisting legal rights. 5 The New Hampshire judiciary serves as a striking example of widespread mistrust of the legal profession. Some of that state's judges made no pretense of being trained as lawyers. John Dudley, a farmer, was elected to the state's supreme court and served from 1785 to 1797.52 He urged jurors to disregard the talk of lawyers; he instructed them to "[b]e just and fear not." 5 " As far as the law was concerned, he said: "It is our business to do justice between the parties ... not by any quirks of the law out of Coke or Blackstone, books I never read, and never will, but by common sense and common honesty between man and man." 5 4 In a famous charge to a jury, Justice Dudley said:
You have heard, gentlemen of the jury, what has been said in this case by the lawyers, the rascals! ... They talk of law. Why, gentlemen, it is not the law we want, but justice. They would govern us by the common law of England.... if it is not wise to confer a permanent tenure of office upon the executive and legislative," he concluded, "it should not be conferred upon the judiciary; and the more so, because the legislative functions which the last perform is a fact entirely hidden from the great majority of the community.... The term of [judicial] office, therefore, should be long enough to enable the public to make a fair trial of the ability and moral qualities of the incumbent; and not so long as to prevent a removal in a reasonable time, if he is deficient in either. cases, minor criminal cases, and a few other matters. 6 ' Three circuit courts, each serving multiple states, were created to exercise appellate jurisdiction over the district courts, and original jurisdiction in civil diversity cases, major criminal cases, and those in which the United States was a party.' Each circuit court was to be staffed by two of the six Justices and one of the district judges from within the circuit; 65 Justices were thus required to be itinerant in a time when their travel was by horse, wagon, or sailing vessel. The apparent purpose of this arrangement was to reduce the risk of selfadvancing, lawless decisions in trial courts by submitting cases to three judges, not one. The full Supreme Court was to hear appeals from circuit court decisions only in those civil cases in which the amount in controversy exceeded two thousand dollars and from decisions of the highest state courts in cases raising federal questions. 66 In the early decades of the new nation, the people to be governed had scant personal contact with this federal judiciary, and this would long remain so. All early federal courts had very short dockets. 6 " Few citizens of moderate means found occasion to invoke either the diversity or admiralty jurisdictions. There were very few federal criminal laws to be enforced, but their enforcement often resulted from politically heated matters.
Id.

2 ANTON-HERMANN
The Constitution forbade treason, 68 reflecting the Founders' concern about the loyalty of a diverse and disconnected citizenship. That concern was soon validated when citizens in the part of North 
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PROVIDING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR JUSTICES
Carolina that later became the state of Tennessee declared the independence of their State of Franklin and sought the protection of the King of Spain. 69 The leader of that effort would not only escape prosecution, but would also be elected the first Governor of Tennessee. 7 " Also among the early treason prosecutions were those resulting from the Whiskey Rebellion of 1791-94.'
1 Farmers in several states, who protested a federal tax on the sale of their one marketable product, conducted the insurrection. 7 ' 2 The rebellion was most bitter in western Pennsylvania; President Washington and the Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, led an army to suppress the uprising. 73 Two participants found to have been violent were convicted of treason, but were later pardoned by the President. 4 In 1794, Congress, concerned about citizens embarking on private invasions of Florida and Louisiana, enacted a presidential proclamation known as the Neutrality Act. 5 It prohibited citizens from "invading and plundering the territories of a nation at peace with the United States. ' 
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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW resolved, he fled to Tennessee.' Later, he presided over Tennessee's legislature and was never prosecuted. 8 ' Neither was Alexander Hamilton, who in 1800 was openly planning a seizure of New Orleans that was not approved by the Adams administration. 8 2
Meanwhile, in 1793, Congress enacted a change to the Judiciary Act to respond to the Justices' complaints about the burdens of "circuit riding" resulting from their duty to attend the occasional proceedings in distant courts. 83 The change cut the burden on each Justice by one-half, not by appointing more judges to handle the small caseload, but by reducing the number of Justices expected to sit on the circuit courts from two to one. As a consequence, circuit courts became two-judge courts with the itinerant Justice presiding.' The district judge sitting with the Justice usually assumed a modest role unless the sitting Justice chose to defer to his lesser colleague.
In 1794, the bar and the public recognized that District Judge John Sullivan was insane or at least too alcoholic to attend court. 8 5 The first judge appointed to the federal district court in New Hampshire by President Washington, he had twice served as governor of that state. 86 To correct his unfortunate situation, Congress took the questionable step of transferring all the jurisdiction of his district court to the circuit court for his region. 7 But Sullivan was not impeached, and he remained on the federal payroll as a judge of a court lacking jurisdiction. 8 Upon the death of Judge Sullivan, Congress reestablished the jurisdiction of the district court for New Hampshire, 9 and the position was given to John Pickering, a former member of the Constitutional Convention and, at the time, chief justice of the state 
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Pickering again became a frequent absentee from work. 3 2 His clerk reported to the circuit court that he had become insane and was not performing his job.' 3 3 These events helped Jefferson's party-then known as the Democratic-Republican Party' 3 4 -sweep the Federalists out of most elective offices, except for those serving in New England. 35 But the outgoing Federalist Congress and President Adams addressed the reality of their defeat in the first weeks of 1801 with the Midnight Judges Act.' 36 That Act added sixteen circuit judgeships (one for each state); these judges would sit on the circuit courts with jurisdictions extended to the constitutional limit.
1 37 The Act also reduced the number of Justices from six to five.' 3 8 But before that provision took effect, a sixth Justice, John Marshall, was appointed and confirmed, apparently in the hope that this overstaffing would prevent the incoming President from making any appointment to the Court. 13 9 And all the new judgeships were quickly filled with loyal Federalists who had lost their offices in the election. 4°F ederalist Governeur Morris explained that his party was "about to experience a heavy gale of adverse wind."' Therefore, he asked, "can they be blamed for casting many anchors to hold their ship through the storm?"' 4 2 Martin Van Buren, no admirer of Morris, later referred to this event as the creation of an "ark of future safety" for Federalist politicians. 4 
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Landis later concluded that the 1801 Act "combined thoughtful concern for the federal judiciary with selfish concern for the Federalist party.""' What Frankfurter and Landis probably had in mind as an expression of "thoughtful concern for the federal judiciary" were the Act's provisions putting an end to so-called circuit riding by Justices and empowering the new circuit judges to disqualify a district judge from deciding cases if they found him to be incapacitated. 4 ' This power was promptly exercised to move Judge Pickering into a state of compensated retirement.' 4 Given the partisan self-serving effect of the Midnight Judges Act, its repeal by the new Democratic-Republican Congress came as no surprise.' 4 But the repeal drew criticism from St. George Tucker, the first scholar of constitutional law and a supporter of President Jefferson.' He argued that it was unconstitutional to terminate sixteen well-behaved district judges by simply abolishing their judgeships. 49 The Act, he said, threatened "the fundamental pillars of free governments" by threatening the job security and independence of judges. 50 His argument was considered and rejected by both Houses of Congress and by the President. In 1979, David Currie gave a somewhat diffident endorsement to Tucker's protest; he concluded that "[flinding new places for a few extra judges may be a fair price to pay for judicial independence."''
Had the Act of 1801 creating those offices been less audacious, and had there been any need for the additional judges, the arguments of Tucker and Currie might have greater force.' 52 But they disregard the larger context of the Midnight Judges Act, which was an insult to the integrity of the nascent federal judiciary because the Act was used for the personal advantage of the judges they appointed. That legislation, it is important to emphasize, was enacted after the Federalists had already lost the election.' 5 3 Its manifest purpose had nothing to do with the duty of Congress and the President to maintain an independent judiciary or secure faithful enforcement of law, but was quite the opposite; its self-dealing was intended to capture offices in the federal judiciary for rejected officeholders." 4 To preserve the judicial offices newly created under those prevailing circumstances would have served as an acceptance of the right of lame duck Congressmen to use the judicial branch, not only as a place of employment of defeated politicians, but for the purely political aim of prolonging their unwelcome political influence.' 55 The forceful contrary argument is that citizen-lawyers defending the integrity of the judiciary should have insisted, as many did, on the repeal of the unseemly Act of 1801.
Although that repeal had the perhaps unintended effect of restoring Judge Pickering to the bench,' 56 no judge was punished for making a substantive decision disapproved by Congress."' Tucker in his 1803 treatise, notwithstanding his previously expressed concern about the Act of 1802, celebrated the federal Constitution as the first to recognize the "absolute independence of the judiciary" as "one of the fundamental principles of the government."' 5 8 He optimistically explained that "the violence and malignity of party spirit, as well in the legislature, as in the executive, requires not less the intervention of a calm, temperate, upright, and independent judiciary."' 59 Congress rightly presented the 1802 Act as legislation to reinstate the integrity of the federal judiciary. No Congress has since been tempted to enact corrupt legislation of the 1801 sort. If 
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one should do so, the task for citizen-lawyers and their bar organizations would be to secure its repeal. 16°B .
Removing a Disabled Judge: The Pickering Case
In 1803, animated in part by overbearing conduct by the remaining Federalist judges, who were proclaimed to be "partial, vindictive, and cruel," 16 ' the Jefferson administration set about the task of removing what some reckoned to be an excess of Federalists among the federal judiciary whose behavior was thought to be less than good. 1 6 2 President Jefferson's initial step was to recommend Judge Pickering's removal.' Congress impeached him for drunkenness and unlawful rulings in an admiralty case involving the ship Eliza. 164 In that case, Pickering had ordered the marshal to release the ship to its owners, who were fellow Federalists, despite the nonpayment of duties it owed-a default exposing the ship to lawful seizure. 16 ors."' 1 6 7 The defense contended that his insanity disabled him from entertaining the criminal intent required to find him guilty of a high crime or misdemeanor.' 6 8 In response to that defense, the Senate agreed to strike the reference to high crimes, but then found him guilty on all counts of behavior that was not sufficiently good, and removed him from office. 169 The Federalists had contended that the Article II language requiring proof of "high crimes or misdemeanors" applicable to impeachment and removal of executive officers was by implication applicable as well to Judge Pickering.
17 0 The Senate's ruling that an Article III judge can be removed for misconduct not rising to "high crimes or misdemeanors," whatever those words might be taken to mean, stands out, but no federal judge has since been impeached and removed who was not also found guilty of criminal misconduct.
No worthy government then or now should require its citizens to submit their disputes for resolution by a drunken Judge Pickering. Indeed, it is manifestly a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to subject a citizen to the power of such judges.' 7 ' If, as Article III provides, impeachment and removal by Congress is the only available means of assuring the rights of citizens to have their cases competently decided, then such judges must be impeached. Notwithstanding the enduring practice of referring to Article III judges as officers enjoying "life tenure," they do not have a right to remain in offices that entail duties they cannot or will not perform. 7 ' They may serve only for the period of their "good behavior."' 73 It was clearly unnecessary, however, to impeach and remove Judge Pickering. The repealed Act of 1801 provided an unobjectionable means for removing him, and there existed no sufficient reason to repeal that provision, or at least not to devise an alternative method of achieving the humane result of retiring disabled judges gently, in a nonpunitive manner. On that point, Currie is surely 
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right that the cost of Judge Pickering's salary is a price worth paying to avoid a use of the impeachment power to remove a judge whose misconduct is not sinister but rather the product of his ill health. 1 74 The failure of Congress in 1802 to address the problem of superannuated and otherwise nonperforming judges imposed burdens and the risk of injustice on randomly selected litigants and lawyers. Given the system of judicial selection established by Article l1,175 it was inevitable and obvious that some judges would, like Pickering, hold their offices long after they were intellectually and emotionally fit to perform the work. And in 1802, it was surely already known that power tends to corrupt and reinforce the selfish or brutal instincts of those on whom it is conferred. But oversight of judicial conduct was left to the appellate process conducted by the itinerant Justices of the Supreme Court. And not until 1889 was there even a right of appeal in a criminal case.' 76 For a century, federal cases were decided by judges who were often unaccountable for their rulings, and some of whom were surely disabled and unfit. It was fortunate that few rights of most citizens in the nineteenth century depended on their enforcement by federal judges.
In 1891, Congress did at last get around to creating the courts of appeals.' 7 7 The legislation was celebrated by its congressional proponent as a law ending "the kingly power" of federal judges.' Until then, the only court reviewing judgments in civil cases was the Supreme Court with its ever-expanding docket.' 7 9 A half-century of agitation by able and committed citizen-lawyers such as Senator Evarts and Congressman Culberson was required to persuade 174 113 Former law professors at Chicago and Harvard recommended Ritter, and he had prospered in private practice as a tax and estates lawyer, in addition to serving as political patron and advisor to Utah's senior United States Senator, a New Deal Democrat." These credentials almost entitled him to judicial office by the standards of the day. 18 5 His appointment by President Truman was indirectly opposed by the Mormon hierarchy and by Utah's junior United States Senator, a Republican, who launched a serious campaign against his nomination-based centrally on allegations that, over the years, he had expressed disapproval of the Constitution and even expressed Communist sentiments."' 8 It was also asserted that he had not been faithful to his wife, and had sometimes manifested a bad temper." 8 ' Ritter was confirmed, but his ill temper was seemingly magnified by the experience. He proved over the years to be an increasingly abusive judge who insulted and degraded court staff and the post office employees with whom he shared a federal office building." s He was also brutal in his dealings with lawyers and litigants, and even with fellow federal judges. In 1954, Judge Ritter's critics, to lessen his power over them, secured the appointment of a second district judge notwithstanding the fact that he had kept a current docket." 8 9 He strongly resented his 'little helper" and attempted to minimize the role of his colleague through the exercise of his powers as chief judge.'" Judge Ritter's personal life also withered. He was brutal in his disapproval of his daughter's marriage, and when his wife chastised him he brought a "girlfriend" to the family farm to meet the family. 19 ' Though his loyal wife did not divorce him, a formal separation agreement forced him to leave their home and live alone.' 9 2 First, he lived in the local University Club, but he was expelled for drunkenly punching the crippled manager for refusing to serve him another drink after hours.' 93 Then, he moved into a hotel room across the street from the courthouse.' 9 4 He was also given to public urination and womanizing. 9 ' By 1972, the mayor of Salt Lake City was prepared to attest that Judge Ritter was biased against the city.' 96 In 1976, the Utah Bar Association was asked to vote to call for Judge Ritter's removal from office.' 97 The contrary prevailing argument was that his removal would impair the independence of the judiciary.' 8 But the bar did agree that his powers as chief judge should not be retained. 199 Soon thereafter, both the State of Utah and the United States Department of Justice moved to disqualify him from sitting on any case to which that government was party. 00 The problems posed by decrepitude were at last eased in 1939 by allowing judges or Justices who certified their disability to retire from regular active duty if their certification was signed by their chief judge or Justice of the circuit. 1 Those who have served for less than ten years, such as Judge Pickering, were retired at half pay. 212 In 1954, judges and Justices were encouraged to withdraw from full duty after an extensive period of service. 2 1 The required period of service varies in length according to their age at the time of appointment, but they may, at the end of that time, either retire at full pay, or take senior status." 4 Those on senior status remain on call by their chiefjudge and generally bear lighter caseloads. 1 5 Most federal judges take senior status when they become eligible because they are then empowered to limit their caseloads. 216 As a consequence of these reforms, decrepit judges in the district courts or courts of appeal are seldom a concern. But these reforms did not address the problem posed by Judge Ritter, who never would have voluntarily surrendered power.
In 1948, at the suggestion of the Judicial Conference, Congress delegated some of the responsibility for the oversight of courts to a Judicial Council in each circuit. 2 17 The 1948 statute provided that "[e]ach judicial council shall make all necessary orders for the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts within its circuit. The district courts shall promptly carry into effect all orders of the judicial council." 2 8 Thus, the district courts were to be subject to restraints in the exercise of their "kingly power," 2 ' 9 but it was not clear what those restraints might be.
In Murrah's Tenth Circuit Judicial Council found that he was "unable or unwilling to discharge efficiently the duties of his office. 226 Judge Chandler petitioned the Supreme Court for an order restoring his docket. 227 The Court, holding that the Council's order was interlocutory and not ripe for review, did not reach the merits of Chandler's constitutional claim that his removal would violate Article 111.22 Justices Black and Douglas dissented, urging that "[w]e should stop in its infancy, before it has any growth at all, this idea that the United States district judges can be made accountable for their efficiency or lack of it to the judges just over them in the federal judicial system. 22 9 Shortly after the Supreme Court's disposition, the indictment of Judge Chandler was dismissed and the matter of his incapacity was settled by assigning him a limited caseload. 2° Had he been convicted, he would have been subject to impeachment and removal 236 In a 159-page report, it recorded his frequent brutality in his treatment of parties, witnesses, lawyers, and fellow judges, 2 37 and it recommended that he be publicly reprimanded and 243 The process now in place explicitly standard pretrial order, which required all principals to attend the conferences. Counsel represented a corporation and its employee, defendants in a suit in which plaintiffs, a woman and her 10-year old daughter, had alleged sexual harassment. One of the allegations was that the individual defendant "had terrorized the 10-year old ... by popping out his glass eye and putting it in his mouth in front of her." The lawyer thought the presence of the individual defendant would be counter-productive to settlement efforts; the individual had no assets and had given her full authority to settle. After chastising the lawyer, Judge McBryde required that she attend a reading comprehension course and submit an affidavit swearing to her compliance. The attorney submitted an affidavit attesting to the fact that she found a course and attended for three hours a week for five weeks. Judge McBryde challenged her veracity and required that she submit a supplemental affidavit "listing'each day that she was in personal attendance at a reading comprehension course in compliance with [the] court's order; the place where she was in attendance on each date; the course title of each course; how long she was in attendance on each day; and the name of a person who can verify her attendance for each day listed." She complied. authorizes the Circuit Judicial Councils to entertain citizens' grievances against federal judges regarding judges' conduct, but only apart from the substance of any rulings they might make. 24 4 Councils may investigate and conduct hearings in confidence, and may reimburse a judge for his expenses if he is found to be unjustly accused of misconduct. 24 5 A Council may order "that, on a temporary basis for a time certain, no further cases be assigned to the judge whose conduct is the subject of a complaint." ' 24 6 Or it may censure a judge either privately or by a public pronouncement. 24 7 Or it may certify his disability or request his voluntary retirement. 24 8 In 2003, the Judicial Conference recommended that all the circuits post their disciplinary orders online. 24 9 In 2008, only two had done so. 25°T he rulings of a Judicial Council may be appealed by the judge or by a complaining party to a standing committee of the national Judicial Conference established to review the decisions of judicial councils. 2 5 ' A matter may also be referred to the Judicial Conference for consideration of a reference to the House of Representatives for possible impeachment and removal. 25 2 But all such actions are explicitly nonreviewable by conventional civil proceedings. 3 The 2002 statute also provides for direct reference to Congress when a judge is convicted of a felony under state or federal law; the Judicial Conference may directly refer the matter to Congress for consideration of possible impeachment and removal. 2 54 Congress, however, has failed to specify standards of judicial behavior, notwithstanding repeated efforts of the American Bar Association (ABA) to express appropriate principles of "good behavior" that have, over time, found their way into the law of every state. 25 
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recommended that some national standards be provided by the Conference. 2 " Mark Harrison, a leader of an ABA commission evaluating the effectiveness of enforcement in state courts of law governing the behavior of judges, has vigorously protested the lack of transparency in a process that relies chiefly on private censure. 6 5 Without endorsing its every word, or approving the weak response of the Conference, we praise this legislation, but wonder why it took over two centuries to establish a suitable process for confronting serious judicial misconduct. A shortage of citizenlawyers advocating the public interest is the most apparent explanation-until recent times, lawyers were not courageous enough to charge a sitting federal judge with misconduct. But at last, a process now provides occasions for the exercise of disinterested assessment of judicial conduct, and citizen-lawyers should employ that process and provide the disinterested assessment the system needs. To be sure, many of the grievances filed against judges, whether state or federal, are and will continue to be undeserving of extended notice.
Had such a process been established in 1802 when the Judiciary Act of 1801 was repealed, it would have served, over the intervening years, to spare many litigants, lawyers, and lesser officers of the court of many abuses and injustices at the hands of federal judges in conditions of physical or psychiatric decline. The process would have enabled the retirement or removal of the most impaired judges, but also would have deterred misconduct that was the product of judicial arrogance, a quality that is probably more likely to evolve in the minds of judges assured of absolute job security and vast powers over others.
Indeed, it is not too much to ask of the new system of discipline that it constrain the misconduct of federal judges in their employment practices. As Richard Posner and his coauthors have recently demonstrated, the conduct of judges in hiring law clerks is often deplorable, and even outrageous. In addition to removing Judge Pickering, the Jeffersonian Congress also considered the removal of Justice Chase .
2 " They did not proceed against him at once, although he had plainly abused his power in Alien and Sedition Act cases. 269 In 1803, Justice Chase, in a charge to a grand jury, proclaimed that the Judiciary Act of 1802, which repealed the Act of 1801, was unconstitutional, and went on to denounce President Jefferson as the author of mobocracy that would destroy "peace and order, freedom and property." 2 70 This was more than the Jeffersonians could stand. 27 He was furious at Randolph's ineffectiveness in presenting the case, as well as over other matters," 9 and perhaps sought to reduce partisan frictions. He later declared that the impeachment process was a "farce" requiring a constitutional amendment to correct an error in our Constitution, which made "any branch independent of the nation." 9° The failure to remove Justice Chase was a serious failure of the duty of Congress to act as a "check and balance" to correct gross abuse of power by a Justice. Prakash and Smith are surely correct that the mere failure to exercise the power to impeach and remove Chase does not tell us the meaning of the constitutional text. 29 ' The failure to remove Chase might be seen as a consequence of the extreme hostility dividing the parties in the Senate, hostility that may have evoked a hope of resolution by a few DemocraticRepublican Senators. 292 Leaving Chase on the Court might indeed have served President Madison's later term in office by reducing the animus and mistrust of the Federalists toward him. 293 The best result in the Chase case would have been achieved if Federalist politicians had joined Randolph in presenting the case against him. Perhaps Chief Justice Marshall's diffident testimony was an attempt to make the dispute less partisan. If he had been more direct in doing so, he would deserve a special salute. We could then point to his conduct in the Chase case as a role model for disinterested citizen-lawyers who, without regard for their partisan connections, could and should have agreed that Chase was unfit for the office he held. For that reason, and not because he was a Federalist, he should have been impeached and removed. Where, indeed, were the citizen-lawyers among the Federalists in the Senate? Why did they wait until after the inauguration of President Jefferson to impeach and remove Chase? Had they removed him when he should have been removed, at the time when, as lame ducks, they were enacting the Judiciary Act of 1801, that legislation would have acquired an entirely different hue. The explanation lies, in large measure, on the intense and inappropriate partisan loyalty of Federalists to one of their own. That sentiment should have been cast aside by those practicing the classical civic virtue of citizen-lawyers.
How To Remove a Justice
It is hard to identify a Justice who has sat on the Supreme Court in the ensuing two centuries who equaled Samuel Chase in his departure from the standard of "good behavior" by openly abusing his or her power. But there have been numerous others who have violated the standard expressed by Lord Coke 2 94 because they ceased to perform their job. Indeed, this has been a recurring problem.
The problems of power-crazed abuse of lawyers and litigants, such as that exhibited by Judge Ritter, 295 are less likely to occur in a multi-judge court. Often, the members of the Supreme Court have found ways to diminish harm resulting from a single Justice's mental disabilities. The requirement of circuit riding imposed by the original Judiciary Act of 1789 long deterred some Justices from clinging to their office when they could not perform its duties. 2 96 Also, for a time, it was traditional for Justices to designate one of their colleagues to advise a senior member of the Court when his time for retirement had come. 29 v In the twentieth century, the burden of being a Supreme Court Justice was greatly diminished. Circuit riding was abolished in 1891.298 In 1925, the Justices were empowered to exercise substantial control over their workload, 2 9 a power extended to be almost 
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[Vol. 50:1105 absolute in 1988." 0 Their quarters were moved from the basement of the Capitol building to the most pretentious building in the capital city, 3 0 1 and Justices were provided with abundant staff support to whom much of their work can be delegated. 3 2 Also in the second half of the twentieth century, the Court's political role increased to the point that many Justices became increasingly reluctant to surrender their vast power, regardless of their physical or mental condition. Some who were able to continue the work resigned from office to avoid a risk that their successor might be named by a politically uncongenial President.°3 Very few have accepted the benefits offered to senior judges, apparently because being a Justice is too gratifying and entails too little work to induce voluntary retirement. In 2000, David Garrow reviewed numerous cases of serious debilitation of Justices and urged a constitutional amendment to address the problem of mental decrepitude. 0 4 Nonconstitutional remedies have also been offered in recent years: variable term limits, 0 5 age limits, 30 6 and even a "golden parachute."" 30 Justices who do not do their job or who use their office for personal advantage commit the two unforgivable sins identified by Edward Coke. 3°8 Their removal is an important and sometimes urgent public business. Surely the Constitution should not be read to prevent that result, so long as the process employed to reach it engages the legislative process... and is designed to exclude or minimize the possibility that the removal is pursued for partisan political reasons. Disinterested citizen-lawyers have a duty to promote a process that would function without regard to the political connections of a Justice whose behavior or failure to perform the office is reasonably questioned.
Consider the possibility that the Republican Congress could have removed Chief Justice Rehnquist when he was plainly disabled, as he was in 2005 and 2006. Or perhaps whether citizen-lawyers should have raised the question of his retirement earlier, when, for a time, he was suffering from substance addiction resulting from a prescribed medication? 3 10 Was it not a duty of the citizen-lawyer to support a request for his retirement as an act needed to support the independence of the judiciary and the integrity of the law? Indeed, where was the organized bar at that time? Is it not unprofessional to prolong and protect the careers of Justices who are no longer doing their jobs? The profession has been, in recent decades, quite responsible in establishing standards of judicial conduct and systems for their enforcement in state courts and very recently in the Judicial Conference.
3 ' But why are there no standards that apply to Justices?
To acknowledge that Congress is responsible for the removal of Justices who are unable or unwilling to practice "good behavior" is not to join Gerald Ford in asserting that the standard for removal of a Justice is whatever the House of Representatives deems it to
McCulloch attracted strong criticism on the merits. Critics accused Marshall and the Court of gross professional misconduct in misusing the indeterminacy of the constitutional text to achieve his political aim of denying sovereignty to the states and usurping the power and responsibility of legislative bodies. 325 The critics were surely correct that the opinion went well beyond the needs of the case. Congress had not forbidden states to tax the Bank except by loose implication; a more defensible decision would have been to uphold the state's power to tax until Congress otherwise explicitly immunized the Bank. 2 6 Congress was at pains to avoid providing any such immunity when the time came to extend the Bank's charter. As his critics recognized, Marshall's holding went far in embedding nationalism in the literature of the legal profession. 3 2 v Marshall, in 1832, privately expressed his astonishment that the Union had lasted as long as it had. 32 ' But he would soon see President Andrew Jackson, who was not a Federalist, invoke his reasoning in McCulloch when Jackson relied on Marshall's opinion as establishing the popular source of constitutional legitimacy, and empowering him to ignore South Carolina's attempt to nullify a federal tax. 329 Another more serious problem with the decision in McCulloch was the fact that the Chief Justice was significantly invested in the Bank. 33 ' He was an original owner of at least ten shares when the Bank opened in 1817. 331 He continued to buy shares in 1818 and, with his wife and brother's estate, owned forty shares in 1819, when he sold five shares and transferred some to other members of his family to be held in trust for his wife. 332 These transactions occurred while the case was pending in the Supreme Court. 3 The decision of the Maryland court had diminished the value of this investment by one-third; the decision in McCulloch restored its value. 34 The capital gain to himself and his family was roughly one-and-one-half times his annual salary as Chief Justice. 33 5 The duty to recuse himself was well-recognized at the time. St. George Tucker had recused himself in a previous case in which his stake was much less than that of Marshall. 33 6 There was no public knowledge at the time of Marshall's behavior, but the facts surfaced in 1837 in the debate on the renewal of the Bank's charter. 3 7 By that time, Marshall had repossessed the shares he had transferred. 3 3 His admirers and political supporters sought to conceal the facts, as did his twentieth-century biographer, Albert Beveridge. 3 39 John Noonan explained Marshall's behavior:
Marshall was committed to the cause of a national bank. Personally, a family investment was at issue. He did not want to abandon either the cause or the investment; so he did not recuse himself and he did not effectively dispose of the interest. Believing that the political cause rightly affected his views, strongly conscious of inner rectitude, and knowing that there was no power on earth to call him to account, he would not have hesitated to believe that he could judge fairly on the merits. 4°J udge Noonan is clearly correct that such conduct, even on the part of one of our most admired Justices, was both a disgrace and a product of the Justice's sense of invulnerability. Had a system been in place to hold the Chief Justice accountable for his misconduct, it probably would not have occurred. Justices today often recuse themselves in situations such as that faced by Chief Justice Marshall, but there may be other forms of inappropriate conduct that ought to be deterred by an appropriate form of accountability for Justices similar to that to which federal judges of lower rank, and virtually all state judges, are subject.
4 1
The presence of such a process might also have encouraged a number of Justices to retire when the period of their service brought them to an age when ordinary Americans retire, because their energy and creativity had begun a steady decline. And none would have remained on the Court when impairments of health and age had resulted in substantial physical and mental deterioration. Instead, many would leave office in a more timely way if they faced a disinterested assessment of their professional competence.
CONCLUSION
Congress should enact legislation providing for the chastisement of Justices or for their removal from office by impeachment on the advice of a panel of independent chief circuit judges in accordance with legislated standards requiring Justices to perform their duties and to abstain from using their powers to benefit themselves. Such legislation is long overdue, violates no valid application of Article III of the Constitution, and would serve to maintain, in the minds of Justices, an awareness of their accountability to their profession. That cause merits the continued support of citizen-lawyers striving to maintain the independence of the federal judiciary.
